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WHY PROSECUTORS RULE THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM—AND WHAT CAN BE DONE
ABOUT IT
Jed S. Rakoff
ABSTRACT—Most recognize that federal and state laws imposing high
sentences and reducing judicial sentencing discretion have created
America’s current plague of mass incarceration. Fewer realize that these
draconian laws shift sentencing power to prosecutors: defendants fear the
immense sentences they face if convicted at trial, and therefore actively
engage in the plea bargaining process. This allows prosecutors, rather than
judges, to effectively determine the sentences imposed in most cases,
which creates significant sentencing discrepancies that most often are
unrecorded and cannot be measured. This Essay proposes a solution that
would not require legislative change to be put into effect: to have
prosecutors occasionally serve as defense counsel for indigent defendants
so prosecutors realize the great power they possess. Unfortunately, I
recognize that such change is unlikely to happen in the near future, leaving
prosecutors in power in the criminal justice system.
AUTHOR—U.S. District Judge, S.D.N.Y. This Essay is adapted from a
speech given by Judge Rakoff at the Conference on Democratizing
Criminal Justice held at the Northwestern University Pritzker School of
Law on November 18, 2016.
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Most prosecutors in the United States are dedicated public servants
whose primary aim and satisfaction is to bring criminals to justice. Within
the adversary system, however, they represent only one point of view, and
under our system of justice, we leave it to neutral players—judges—to
resolve competing points of view. Where, instead, when the advocates for
one side are given near-total power over the resolution of such disputes,
balance is lost and abuses are inevitable. This is what has happened over
the past few decades in the United States, with prosecutors increasingly
being thrust into the role, not of advocates, but of rulers—with very
unfortunate results.
The plea bargain is the ultimate source of this ever-increasing
prosecutorial power. It lacks both constitutional and historical grounding;
indeed, it barely existed before the Civil War. But thereafter, a combination
of circumstances—such as the dislocations following that tragic conflict,
the flood of destitute immigrants arriving in the United States in the late
nineteenth century, and the increase in effective U.S. police techniques
modeled on the “Bobbies” of England—led to prosecutors charging far
more persons with criminal offenses than U.S. judges and juries could
possibly handle. To deal with this overload, prosecutors increasingly
offered criminal defendants the opportunity to plead to lesser charges, and
the “plea bargain” was born.1
After a while, plea bargaining took on a life of its own. While the
Supreme Court initially regarded the practice with some skepticism, by the
middle of the twentieth century it had become an accepted feature of the
U.S. criminal justice system.2 In the 1970 case of North Carolina v. Alford,
the Supreme Court even went so far as to accept as constitutional a
defendant’s guilty plea to second-degree murder, even when he asserted he
was innocent of any murder but was pleading guilty to avoid the likelihood
of a conviction of the capital offense of first-degree murder.3
Nonetheless, for most of the twentieth century until the 1970s, roughly
15% to 20% of those charged with federal criminal offenses whose cases
were not dismissed by the prosecutor still went to trial;4 and, although the
statistics for state jurisdictions are less readily available, they appear to be
similar overall.5 This had a salutary effect: with prosecutors unsure of
1

See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10, 19, 25,
34–35 (1979).
2
Id. at 6, 26.
3
400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
4
Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L. REV. 151, 155
& fig.1, 196–97 (2005).
5
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004).
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whether a case might go to trial after all, they not only had to be prepared
to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but also had to be
cognizant that their conduct and the conduct of the police agents might be
scrutinized by a court of law in pretrial suppression hearings or during trial
itself.
Moreover, throughout most of the twentieth century, the plea bargain
served to place a maximum “cap” on the sentence that might be imposed,
but otherwise sentencing discretion was left to the judge. For example,
when I was a federal prosecutor in the Southern District of New York in
the 1970s, the office policy was never to recommend a sentence, but rather
to leave the judge unfettered discretion to sentence the defendant anywhere
in the typically very broad range between zero and the statutory maximum
without any input from the prosecution. In nearby state court, the practice
was nominally different—prosecutors would seek advanced judicial
approval for a defendant to plead guilty to an offense for which he would
be guaranteed a sentence within a specified range. However, the range was
typically so broad (e.g., “five to fifteen years”) as to still give the judge
substantial sentencing discretion.
Material changes to the plea bargaining system occurred after crime
rates began to rise dramatically, beginning in the mid-1960s and peaking in
1995.6 In response to these increased crime rates, Congress and the state
legislatures enacted laws that for most crimes imposed much higher
sentences and greatly reduced judicial sentencing discretion. These
included laws imposing lengthy mandatory minimum sentences (such as
five, ten, and twenty years in the case of many drug offenses), laws
requiring life sentences and the like for “career offenders” (such as the
“three strikes” law in California), and sentencing “guidelines” that in
practice dictated severe sentences in most cases (such as the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, which were mandatory before 2005).7
The most prominent effect of these laws has been the terrible mass
incarceration that continues to plague this country. Currently, 2.2 million
people, mostly young men of color, are in jail or prison—far more than in
any other country in the world.8 Another effect has been to cause innocent
people to plead guilty in order to avoid the risk that, if they go to trial and

6

See Gary LaFree, Book Review, Explaining the Crime Bust of the 1990s, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 269, 270 (2000).
7
See, e.g., Nathan Greenblatt, How Mandatory Are Mandatory Minimums? How Judges Can Avoid
Imposing Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2008); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 199–200, 208, 222 (1993).
8
Criminal Justice Facts, SENTENCING PROJECT (2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/criminaljustice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/6CAK-GNMN].
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are convicted on the heavy and multiple charges that prosecutors now
typically include in indictments (in part to promote plea bargaining),9 they
will face huge sentences that most judges will have little power or incentive
to mitigate. For instance, of the more than 340 convicted felons who,
through the work of the Innocence Project, were subsequently exonerated
and freed, a full 10% had pleaded guilty to crimes that they were later
proved to have never committed.10
But a less-noticed effect of these draconian laws has been to shift
sentencing power to the prosecutors. Now, under intense pressure to find
ways to avoid the immense sentences they will face if they go to trial and
are convicted, virtually all defendants—whether innocent or guilty—beg
prosecutors to let them plead to reduced charges. The statistics bear witness
to this shift. For decades, as noted, 15% to 20% of federal defendants went
to trial.11 But as soon as mandatory minimums and mandatory guidelines
took effect in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the percentage began to
rapidly decrease: by 2000 only 5% of all federal defendants (reportedly
even a smaller percentage of state defendants) went to trial.12 In 2015, only
2.9% of federal defendants went to trial, and, although the state statistics
are still being gathered, it may be as low as less than 2%.13 These tiny
percentages have remained relatively constant in the 2000s even though
crime rates have steadily and dramatically declined since 1996, so that the
system can no longer claim to be “overloaded.”
The net result is that prosecutors, rather than judges, now effectively
determine the sentences to be imposed in most cases. They do this in plea
bargains hammered out in the prosecutors’ offices in unrecorded
conversations with defense counsel—sessions in which, because of the
pressure on defendants to reduce their sentencing exposure, the prosecutors
effectively hold most of the cards. Furthermore, not only are these sessions
secret, one-sided, and lacking judicial oversight, but also the results vary
materially from prosecutor to prosecutor. Thus, the sentencing
9

Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 701 (2014).
DNA
Exonerations
in
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United
States,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT
(2016),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/R8XL-H2JL].
11
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
12
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2000, at 53
(2002), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs00.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MC8-FP7J]; see MATTHEW
R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY
SENTENCES
IN
STATE
COURTS,
2000,
at
9
tbl.10,
10
(2003),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc00.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9NR-GV2E]. The corresponding
5% trial rate for state defendants only included defendants charged with a felony.
13
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES—FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 4
(2016),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/
2016/FY15_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/279K-YXHM].
10
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discrepancies (i.e., substantially different sentences for the same crime) that
the statutory sentencing guidelines were intended to reduce still occur.
Even more troubling is that without oversight, no one can even begin to
measure the extent of such discrepancy.
What can be done about this unfortunate shift of power from judges to
prosecutors, that is, from neutrals to advocates? The most obvious, and
best, solution would be a repeal of mandatory minimum and career
offender laws (something the federal judiciary has requested for several
decades) and a considerable reduction in the sentences “recommended” by
sentencing guidelines. But although a growing recognition of the costs and
evils of mass incarceration has fostered some bipartisan efforts in this
direction, it appears unlikely to command the support of the new federal
administration or of the many state legislatures whose members know that
it is still good politics to be “tough on crime.” Moreover, even if U.S.
sentences were made considerably less draconian than current laws require
them to be, it is unlikely that prosecutors, having now realized the power
that plea bargaining gives them to effectively determine sentences, would
voluntarily relinquish that power in circumstances where the sentences
were less severe.
So, what about doing away with plea bargaining altogether? This, in
fact, is the status quo in many European countries. In Germany, for
example, where plea bargains are officially not recognized (though they do
occur, sub rosa, in a few cases), roughly 50% of all criminal cases go to
trial, and most of the remaining cases are resolved through de facto pleas to
the initial charges.14 Unfortunately, the plea bargain system is now so
embedded in the American criminal justice system that, notwithstanding
the great decrease in crime since 1995 mitigating the practical need for plea
bargaining, there does not appear to be any vocal support for doing away
with plea bargains altogether.
Some more modest, halfway measures have been suggested. Years
ago, the late Professor James Vorenberg of Harvard Law School suggested
that the Department of Justice promulgate binding regulations, similar to
those enacted by administrative agencies, that would govern plea

14

Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 1532
(2010); Cornelius Nestler, Sentencing in Germany, 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 109, 116 (2003) (“[I]n
roughly 50% of all cases the prosecution acts on the basis of the assumption that there is sufficient
reason to believe that a crime was committed; in these cases, the prosecutors then decide either to bring
about an indictment in court, to apply in writing for a penal order, or to conclude the cases according to
sections 153 and 153a of the Procedural Code that allow for a termination of the proceedings by the
prosecutor.”).
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bargaining in the federal government.15 Yet, when Vorenberg himself
became Director of the Justice Department’s Office of Criminal Justice in
the Kennedy Administration—a position in which he was supposed to
promulgate major policy initiatives—he was unable to get anyone to back
his proposal. Aside from the fact that most of the criminal justice system is
administered by the states, Vorenberg’s proposal encountered opposition
based on the concern that administrative oversight of federal plea
bargaining would create satellite litigation that would hamper the speed
with which criminal defendants were brought to trial—always a key aim of
any criminal justice system that aspires to meaningful deterrence.16 That
same objection could rightly be made today.
In a more recent variation on Vorenberg’s proposal, Professor
Stephanos Bibas has proposed that various prosecutorial agencies, state and
federal, each adopt some internal guidelines that, while not enforceable by
outside parties, would nevertheless bring some order to prosecutors’
exercise of discretion in the plea bargaining process.17 Although I admire
Professor Bibas, I am skeptical that this would have much effect. When I
was a young prosecutor, there stood on my bookshelf a multi-volume work
of the then-existing internal rules for federal prosecutors entitled the “U.S.
Attorneys Manual.” I never opened it, and I don’t think any of my
colleagues did either. We learned what the “rules” were from our more
senior colleagues; and if what they told us was wrong or misguided, there
was no one—individual or agency—to correct them. I suspect this is still
the case. Moreover, only the prosecutor assigned to a case really knows the
evidence in the case; and if the prosecutor wanted to apply any putative
internal plea bargain guidelines so as to fit the result she desired (whether
harsh or lenient, depending on her personality and ideology), she could
easily interpret the evidence so as to fit her disposition, and no chief would
know enough to say her nay. When not put to the test of the adversary
system, evidence is almost always “flexible” in this way.
Two years ago, in an essay in the New York Review of Books, I
proposed a variation on what is sometimes referred to as a “preliminary
hearing.”18 Specifically, in my formulation, the prosecutor and defense
15

See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1562–
65 (1981).
16
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 912 (2009).
17
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 957 (2006).
18
Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/
[https://perma.cc/
8DRB-2GWA].
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counsel would be required to appear shortly after indictment before a
judicial officer, who would separately question them, in camera and under
seal, as to what their evidence was, what discovery they would likely have,
and what disposition they were seeking. The judicial officer, without
revealing any of this information to the other side or to the judge who
would be assigned to the case for all other purposes, would then
recommend to the parties what leads still needed to be explored, what
disclosures needed to be made, and, where appropriate, what the judicial
officer thought would be a fair disposition of the case. In other words, the
judicial officer would, in effect, oversee the plea bargaining process and,
while not having the power to force either side to his view, could use her
persuasive powers to assure a fairer, more neutral process.
A variation on this proposal is currently in practice in the State of
Connecticut and has achieved good reviews from prosecutors and defense
counsel alike.19 Nevertheless, it is currently forbidden by the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, when I tried to persuade my immediate
colleagues to try a pilot variation that could be done, on consent of all
involved, even under the prevailing rules, I was met with strong
resistance—the primary objection being that such an early involvement in
the criminal process would compromise judicial neutrality. This objection
ignores the fact that the bulk of action in the current federal criminal
process occurs during the plea bargaining stage. For a judge to not get
involved at that stage is to guarantee, in effect, no meaningful judicial
involvement in the process at all. Nevertheless, I accept that this proposal is
not proving to be attractive.
Finally, I come back to a very modest proposal that I first made in
1976—only to have it immediately shot down by the country’s most
prominent prosecutor. The occasion was the visit of then-Attorney General
of the United States, Edward H. Levi, to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in
Manhattan, following his single-handed restoration of order and neutrality
to the Department of Justice in the wake of Watergate. After an inspiring
speech, Levi entertained questions, and I asked him whether, in order to
make prosecutors more conscious of their obligation to do justice rather
than just secure convictions, it might be a good idea to have prosecutors
occasionally serve as defense counsel—a practice permitted in the United
Kingdom. Showing that he was still a “Paper Chase” law professor at heart,
Levi responded: “That’s not a wholly bad idea, not wholly bad!” I slunk
away in shame.

19

See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View,
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 247–56 (2006).
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Nevertheless, I am now shameless enough to think it is a good idea.
Under my plan, state and federal prosecutors would be required to spend
six months out of every three years of their term (three years is the
minimum term required of most federal prosecutors) serving as defense
counsel for indigent defendants, with the defendants’ consent and subject to
the supervision of the local legal aid supervisor. In some cases, to avoid
conflicts, the prosecutor in one locale might serve his time as defense
counsel in another locale. I can think of no other step more likely to make
prosecutors aware of the great power they possess or the need to temper it
with other considerations.
I do not believe that this last proposal would require any legislative
change to be put into effect, though it would, of course, require the consent
of both prosecutorial and legal aid offices. (Many legal aid offices, for
reasons that will not bear scrutiny, will never hire former prosecutors as
legal aid lawyers, even though the reverse is not true.) Unfortunately, I am
also quite confident that the idea is too great a departure from existing U.S.
practice to meet with quick approval.
So I end with the not very optimistic conclusion that, for the
immediate future at least, prosecutors, rather than judges, will be the real
rulers of the American criminal justice system. And I ask you: is that fair?
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